The American Enigma:
U.S. War Policy During the Roosevelt Era



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Forward

It was not easy for us Europeans from the mainland to find our way through the labyrinth of contemporary North American foreign policy.
Too much of what happened during the first eight years of the Roosevelt era seemed contradictory to us: we saw stark contrasts between the assertions of yesterday and today, between words and deeds, between goals and the means to achieve them, and we also observed that the American President considered the very same phenomena that he publicly condemned among some peoples to be not only excusable among others, but even natural and legitimate - indeed, we discovered that this foremost standard-bearer of the democratic world order, this champion of freedom and human rights, is himself a true-blue autocrat who is only barely able to conceal this inner disposition.
Yet, looking beyond all those jarring contradictions and through all the confusion, one thing finally became crystal clear to us: Roosevelt's America hates the young revolutionary movements of the so-called Old World with a fervor that truly seems Old Testament in nature.

A wave of hostility is washing over us from across the Atlantic, one that is all the more strange because it lacks any objective cause or any reasonable foreign-policy justification: under the President's leadership, the American people seem to be under the spell of the delusion that the European revolution will sooner or later launch an assault on the "Western Hemisphere," i.e., the two Americas.
Now, reasonable people tend not to take the pathological outbursts of foreigners—who are far enough out of harm's way—too seriously: that is also our attitude in this case, for between us and the Yankees, who are behaving so wildly, lies the Atlantic, and this ocean is wide and deep enough to give us a sense of complete security - after all, whatever manages to cross it is, under any circumstances, so insignificant that we, relying on our impregnable mainland position, will have no trouble dealing with it, and whatever comes across now during the war will be—"with or without an escort," as the Führer has announced—torpedoed and bombed.

But in another respect, the United States' stance is crucial to the war, even if not decisive, for it prolongs the war: it is the last straw to which the British Empire is clinging.
The Serbs and Greeks have experienced, in these spring days of 1941, the terrible misfortune that Roosevelt's policies brought upon small nations and states: it was Roosevelt who ultimately dealt the death blow to Yugoslavia, and that is why millions of Europeans are asking themselves how this puzzling American stance came about.

In this short treatise, which has been developed from a series of essays in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, we will now attempt, drawing primarily on American sources, to trace in retrospect the path that U.S. foreign policy has taken since Roosevelt took office - in doing so, it will be unavoidable to examine the President's character in depth, for America's path during this period was in fact Roosevelt's path—it is his path far more so than America's path during the First World War was Wilson's path.
Franklin Roosevelt belongs, albeit in a negative, destructive sense, to the ranks of men who make history, while Woodrow Wilson, the neurasthenic and dreamer, was largely driven by external forces—Roosevelt, the domineering but also skillful autocrat, drives himself.

- Berlin, April 1941

1. Symbolic Origins

Adolf Hitler's rise from the very heart of his people is now known throughout the world, and Benito Mussolini came from the family of a village blacksmith - meanwhile, Winston Churchill is the son of a lord from the House of the Dukes of Marlborough and a North American plutocrat, while Franklin Delano Roosevelt is the wealthy scion of an old Dutch-English family that belongs to the American aristocracy: the backgrounds of these two pairs of friends are revealing, for they are, in a sense, symbolic of the worlds for which and around which they are fighting.

The Führer and the Duce became politicians out of the strongest instinct for survival and out of a passionate love for their peoples; Churchill and Roosevelt meanwhile, like so many of their peers, entered politics out of family tradition and a desire to pursue a craft that satisfied their ambition.
Churchill's father, Lord Randolph Churchill, was a well-known and notorious politician at the turn of the century; Franklin Roosevelt's uncle, Theodore Roosevelt, served as President of the United States from 1901 to 1909.
Churchill had previously dabbled in all sorts of professions, and Roosevelt's original main profession was that of a respected New York lawyer - in comparison, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were workers and soldiers.

From childhood onward, Roosevelt had a keen interest in all things English—in England's fairy tales, its political ideals, its *Magna Carta*, its lords, its parliamentary system, and its so-called freedom of the press.
He knows England firsthand from numerous trips; he has also visited Germany and France and speaks and reads some German.
His English is free of Americanisms and American coloration, and although he has a masterful command of American political catchphrases and knows how to appeal to the American psyche like few others, his inner essence is un-American—it is "New Dutch," it is English.
His enthusiasm for the navy—especially for large battleships—also stems from this source: during the First World War, he served under Woodrow Wilson as Under Secretary of the Navy, where he vigorously advocated for the expansion of the U.S. fleet.
It is not insignificant to the man's character that he was an unconditional Wilsonian at the time, that he shared Wilson's love for a League of Nations, and that he remained faithful to Wilson's policies even after leaving office—at a time when the vast majority of the American people and Congress had already recognized and rejected those policies as a departure from the Monroe Doctrine and an entanglement of America in European affairs.
Roosevelt, like his future Secretary of State Hull, fought vigorously in 1919 for the United States to accept the Versailles Treaty: his aversion to isolationism—to a purely American policy—is therefore of quite long standing.
Roosevelt also retained his fondness for the fleet and large warships: he is said to have beamed like a child when, in January 1941, the new British ambassador, Lord Halifax, sailed up the Hudson River aboard the brand-new battleship "King George V."
Unlike many of his American compatriots, Franklin Roosevelt never fully detached himself from Europe in his heart, for he admires the old European traditions and, in particular, the lifestyle and demeanor of the

English aristocracy: he had an unmistakable soft spot for European royalty, and he was also the first U.S. President to invite an English king to Washington.

Roosevelt rose to political prominence in New York City and New York State, and he was governor of New York when he was elected President in 1932 - this, too, is important, for New York is not America par excellence, just as London is not England and Paris is not France.
New York is a foreign element within the American character, a city-state that the average American perceives as un-American: New York is the city of immigrants, the Babel of European emigration, whose population has not yet fully undergone the process of Americanization; New York is home to the vast Black neighborhood of Harlem, and above all, New York is a great Jewish city—the largest Jewish city in the world.
Judaism is powerful and influential in the United States, but nowhere is it as powerful and dominant as in New York: it was in New York that a group of people began to rally around the ambitious, distinguished governor—a group that later became known by the nickname "Roosevelt's Brain Trust," comprising Baruch, Frankfurter, Roseman, and Morgenthau; they were his advisors and supporters on the path to his—and their—power.

Franklin D. Roosevelt is enormously ambitious, but he is said not to have always been that way.
It is said that in his younger years he was the typical "young man from a prominent family," without any outstanding qualities, talents, or goals; then, some time after the First World War, he was struck by a serious illness that left him with a severe physical disability.
This personal misfortune seems to have become the turning point of his life—the "trauma" that made him restless and spurred him on to the feverish activity we associate with him today.

These were the key circumstances in the life of the man who became President of the United States of America in 1933.

2. First Foreign Policy Attempts

When Roosevelt took over the reins of the United States from his predecessor, Herbert Hoover, on March 4th, 1933, he likely had no clear goal of going down in American history as a foreign policy leader of historic stature - instead, his ambition was focused on a different area: he wanted to become his country's great social and economic reformer.
His agile mind was filled with plans and ideas aimed at breaking the dominance of "Big Business"—of big-capitalism—which had repeatedly plunged North America into massive economic crises, and was apparently incapable of meeting the demands of the present.
The new President dreamed of winning over the broad masses; he dreamed of a form of government that in old Europe would have been called, for example, a "Volkskaisertum."[1]

But even the start was ill-fated, for Roosevelt took office just one month after the National Socialists seized power in Germany.
For him, this meant the following: at the very moment he was preparing to reform North America's democratic-plutocratic system, here in the Old World, a social-revolutionary doctrine of the greatest magnitude was being put into practice; at the very same historical moment when, over in the U.S., a scion and member of the capitalist class began to court the favor of the broad American masses, here on the other side of the Atlantic, a man from those very same broad masses was purposefully and relentlessly uprooting the existing social system.
Admittedly, an entire ocean and fundamentally different historical and economic conditions lay between the two undertakings, but in the age of modern communication, news of what was happening in Europe still crossed the great waters loudly enough to make comparisons possible—indeed, to invite them; added to this was the fact that the revolutionary movement was by no means limited to Germany, but had a clear parallel in Italian Fascism, and might one day come to engulf all of Europe.

Roosevelt's domestic political path was thus fraught from the outset with the danger that other, foreign statesmen might threaten to "steal his thunder."
We know from the President's personal remarks that he envied the German Führer for his "powers" and his "freedom of action", but these outward manifestations of leadership were also the only things he had noticed and understood; for the rest, he saw only the side effects of the nascent European revolution, about which the Anglo-Saxon Jewish press was clamouring with all its might to rally against.
His Jewish friends in New York, who were now coming and going at the White House in Washington, had made sure to see to that: no wonder then that even the first foreign policy actions of this new President contained a clear dig at the rising powers of Europe.

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In early March 1933, the Jewish-influenced section of the North American press was full of horror stories about the "first persecutions of Jews" that had allegedly broken out in Berlin - thus, under the pretext that Jews with American passports had also suffered during the riots, the State Department in Washington was

[1] Meaning "people's empire"; a concept which sees a ruler wield absolute power through the will of the masses instead of parliamentary procedures or aristocratic traditions. - The Translator

besieged with demands to lodge a protest with the Reich government, though Secretary Hull at most limited himself to requesting a report from the American ambassador in Berlin about the situation.
Mr. Hull was satisfied with the ambassador's reply that the German authorities had promised to protect American Jews - but not so the Jewish agitators in New York!
What then took place behind the scenes in Washington at that time was recorded a few years later by two well-known journalists close to the White House in their book on American foreign policy[2]:

"The German response satisfied Cordell Hull's career diplomats, but not the large Jewish group that had worked to secure Roosevelt's election: Samuel Untermyer, who had signed his name to substantial checks when Jim Farley[3] needed funds for Democratic headquarters, protested vigorously, and so did Felix Frankfurter, one of the power brokers behind the Brain Trust.
Professor Moley[4] listened distractedly and referred Frankfurter to Chief Justice Brandeis; Secretary of State Hull, on the other hand, listened attentively."

At the end of March, as new rumors of atrocities emerged from Berlin, the Jewish clique intensified its campaign - let us hear again from Pearson and Brown:

"Old Henry Morgenthau, who had donated $7,000 to Roosevelt at a time when no one yet thought to take his political ambitions seriously, made an indignant trip to Washington; afterwards, three congressional resolutions authorized the State Department to lodge protests in Berlin."

One could hardly depict more clearly than in this account—written by American eyewitnesses sympathetic to Roosevelt—the early interference in the new President's foreign policy by the New York Jews who had financed Roosevelt's first election campaign.

It is revealing to compare such early American voices with the impression that a foreigner later formed regarding Roosevelt's relationship to Judaism.
A confidential report dated January 12th, 1939, from the Polish ambassador in Washington, Count Potocki, to the Warsaw government states:

"Individual Jewish intellectuals took part in this initiative[5], such as Bernard Baruch, New York State Governor Lehmann, the newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, and others who are personal friends of President Roosevelt: they want the President to become a champion of human rights, religious freedom, and freedom of speech, and they want him to punish troublemakers in the future.
This group of people, who hold the highest positions in the American government and who present themselves as the representatives of 'true Americanism' and as 'defenders of democracy,' are in fact bound by unbreakable ties to international Jewry - thus, for this Jewish International, which has the interests of its own race above all else in mind, elevating the President of the United States to this 'most ideal' position as a defender of human rights was a truly ingenious move, for in this way, they have

[2] *The American Diplomacy Game*, by Drew Pearson and Constantin Brown, New York 1935
[3] Roosevelt's campaign manager
[4] From Hull's State Department
[5] Against the Führer and German policy

created a very dangerous hotbed of hatred and hostility in this hemisphere and divided the world into two hostile camps."

Potocki's unvarnished secret report proves that Jewish influence over the President had become even more powerful by 1939.

The new President would have been perfectly capable of curbing the American press's vicious smear campaign against the new Germany, but he never made the slightest attempt to do so; nor did he prevent the federal authorities' harassing customs policies against German trade, nor did he recall his ambassador to Berlin, Dodd, whose residence—just like that of the British ambassador, Phipps—was a meeting place for prospective emigrants and a veritable marketplace of horrors, for what the Mowrers[6] and Knickerbockers[7] wrote originated largely from these residences.
At no time and in no area did President Roosevelt make any effort to cultivate German-American relations—which had been good under President Hoover—while he maintained close contact with London and Paris: even back then, the British ambassador—Sir Ronald Lindsay's wife was a school friend of Mrs. Roosevelt—was among the White House's inner circle, and even before taking office, the President sent his friend Bullitt, who would later play such a major role in the run-up to the war with England, on a fact-finding mission to Europe.
As a result of this Bullitt mission, Roosevelt then received, in the early days of his presidency, visits from two prominent envoys of the Western powers: British Prime Minister MacDonald, and the leading French democrat Edouard Herriot; these visits were significant and, as we know today, foreshadowed the future.

After Roosevelt had listened to and approved the disarmament plans of the elderly, personally well-meaning MacDonald, he promptly collapsed immediately afterward, following a tirade from Herriot - Pearson and Brown described the meeting with the Frenchman as follows:

"Roosevelt knew France; he understood its quest for security, and he felt full sympathy when Herriot told him about Germany's secret arms depots.
Roosevelt expressed sincere concern about this, and Herriot took full advantage of the opportunity: he described in detail the French General Staff's report on the German arms factories abroad, which were operating in 24-hour shifts in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Russia; he spoke of the immense efforts being made by German electrical and chemical laboratories to develop new weapons of destruction; he recounted every hair-raising story about Germany that came to mind, leaving nothing to the imagination...

Roosevelt was now thoroughly in the mood to help preserve world peace, and the program he outlined to Herriot stood in sharp contrast to the vacillating international policy of his predecessor, Herbert Hoover, and was by no means half-hearted - above all, Roosevelt was prepared to accept the Consultative Pact, with which London strongly disagreed; he was prepared, under certain circumstances, to abandon the traditional American policy of freedom of the seas, and finally—and this was probably the most important

[6] Edgar Ansel Mowrer, American journalist who was against the Third Reich and wrote about them repeatedly from 1933 onwards; also author of the book *Germany Puts The Clock Back* in 1933. - The Translator
[7] Hubert Renfro Knickerbocker, another American journalist who was against the Third Reich and wrote about them repeatedly; author of *The Truth about Hitlerism* in 1933. - The Translator

point from the French perspective—he favored an American arms embargo against any nation that would be declared an aggressor.
This was almost a kind of alliance and thus exactly what France wanted: Herriot was delighted."

When he departed, the President presented him with a portrait bearing a handwritten French dedication:

"A mon ami, Edouard Herriot. Vive l'amitié franco-américaine."[8]

Shortly thereafter, Roosevelt's special envoy Davis announced at the Geneva Disarmament Conference that the American government endorsed the French demand for international arms control, and in mid-May, the President himself unveiled a disarmament plan that, while ostensibly endorsing the MacDonald Plan, in practice fully covered up the French sabotage of disarmament: this was achieved primarily through the provision that no nation should increase its armaments beyond the "treaty limits." The American President thus clung to the scandalous armaments provisions of Versailles, and as Pearson and Brown explain in their book:

"Roosevelt had supported the French position almost one hundred percent.
Herriot and France's Foreign Minister Paul Boncour were beaming; the French press was enthusiastic and openly announced a united front of France, England, and the United States against Germany."

Since the days of Versailles, France had begged in vain for an alliance with the U.S. against Germany, and during the last twelve years of Republican Party rule in Washington, the old Parisian dream had receded further than ever: America had become isolationist.
The fact that the new Democratic President, right from the start of his term, sailed full steam ahead into French waters made a deep and lasting impression on the French and, more than anything else, led them to the obstinacy that culminated in April 1934 in Foreign Minister Barthou's final rejection of the idea of disarmament.
No less devastating was Roosevelt's stance during the World Economic Conference, which convened in London in early summer 1933: everything depended on whether the United States, as the largest creditor and gold power, was prepared to agree to a reduction in war debts and currency stabilization, and for two days, envoys from around the world waited in London with bated breath for the White House's verdict - but when it finally came, it was a "no" cloaked in reproachful words!
MacDonald, Britain's Prime Minister and President of the conference, described Roosevelt's response to friends in the following words:

"If a man says something you don't like, and he says it in a pleasant way, then at least you can reply; but if someone says nothing in an unpleasant way, then there is no reply."

The disappointment was immense.

The new President of the United States' first forays into foreign policy had thus done nothing but cause harm and strengthened the European reaction—which at that time was embodied primarily by France—in

[8] *"To my friend Edouard Herriot: long live Franco-American friendship!"*

an unforeseen way; even in official London, the American President's stance at the time was seen as an obstacle to the establishment of more peaceful conditions and sentiments in Europe.
It should be noted that at that time in London, men like MacDonald and Simon set the tone, while the Churchill group—which was always fanatically anti-German—remained completely on the sidelines and was not taken seriously by the country's leading politicians.

Roosevelt was likely little bothered by the displeasure of MacDonald's British supporters, but he was all the more troubled, however, by the observation that his initial actions and omissions in the field of foreign policy were met with suspicious rejection even within the United States itself; even part of the press, especially the newspapers of the Hearst Group, stated outright that the President had fallen in line with Wilson's First World War policy, and concerned unease was also evident in Congress.
What hit Roosevelt hardest, however, was the justified accusation that he had made major concessions to the Western European powers without securing anything in return that would have been beneficial to the United States - the President therefore deemed it appropriate, after thorough consultation with his advisors at the State Department, to make a complete about-face and retract almost everything he had just promised the French, partly publicly and partly privately.
Special Envoy Davis was instructed to issue the following statement before the Geneva Disarmament Conference:

"We are gathered here in Geneva solely for the purpose of disarmament: we are not interested in the political side of the matter—nor, for that matter, in purely European affairs.
We reaffirm that we are in no way bound to any European power, and whether or not conditions are favorable for continuing the current disarmament efforts is a question that must now be decided by Europe, and not by the United States."

In short, Roosevelt quickly retreated from foreign policy when he found the isolationist sentiment among his people still too strong, and with redoubled zeal, he now threw all his energy into domestic policy and began his great economic reform program.

3. The New Deal's Misstep

Roosevelt's predecessors—the three Republican Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover—had essentially taken the view that the postwar economic crises, and in particular the Great Depression of 1929, were more or less normal phenomena of the prevailing international economic order and would, so to speak, be overcome "on their own" through "natural" processes; Roosevelt, by contrast, was the first to recognize with any degree of clarity that the system itself was flawed, and that significant government intervention was needed to adapt America's economy to the demands of the times: in this, he was determined to carry out such government interventions.
The theoretical direction in which he sought a remedy is illustrated by the following statement by Tugwell[9], one of his advisors on the "Brain Trust":

"If we have no purchasing power, we lack everything, but if we have it, we possess everything of real value—true prosperity.
Admittedly, such a thing cannot be achieved through magic formulas, as many people seem to assume, but neither is it an impenetrable mystery that human will is bound to fail to overcome.
There is only one thing left to do—we must take the money from where it is and put it where it should be: this means that the only remedy lies in the brutal and relentless taxation of the rich, in a very generous redistribution of wealth by the government to those consumers who use their money for useful purchases and thereby set the stalled machine in motion once more, thereby recreating their own earning potential and purchasing power - thus, instead of wasting our ingenuity on financial matters, we should restore purchasing power."[10]

The two main pillars of the practical reform program that sailed under the banner of the "New Deal" were the AAA and the NIRA—the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act, respectively; meanwhile the term "New Deal" itself—a political catchphrase typical of Roosevelt—can be roughly translated as "New Social Justice."

It would go too far in this context to attempt here to describe the extensive and complicated body of New Deal legislation in detail, and we can also spare ourselves this effort because the political backlash in Congress and the business community has so thoroughly undermined the New Deal that it plays virtually no role today: it only suffices to know that Roosevelt initially succeeded in securing the legislature's approval for a series of far-reaching measures that were unprecedented in America, such as assistance for the unemployed, old-age pensions, aid for impoverished farmers, improvements to starvation wages, the rescue of trading houses and firms on the brink of bankruptcy, and the reorganization of the banks, and that the statistics from those early Roosevelt years also show that the first attempt bore fruit: unemployment declined, the number of business failures fell, farmers' incomes rose, and the industrial production index did likewise.
This makes it all the more incomprehensible, then, that the President did not persist along this path, but instead yielded to the ever-growing resistance of "Big Business" and the capitalist reaction, for although they did not dare to openly and directly attack Roosevelt's reform program, they entrenched themselves behind the Constitution and played off the constitutional rights of Congress and the states against the

[9] Rexford Tugewell, economic advisor to Roosevelt. - The Translator
[10] Quoted from Rudolf Lank, "USA in Not und Ueberfluß" (USA in Distress and Abundance), Berlin 1939

President and Washington; their main tool was the Supreme Court, which in 1935 and 1936 ruled that the most important provisions of the AAA and the NIRA were unconstitutional.

For a time, the President toyed with the idea of taking up the constitutional battle and making the Supreme Court compliant with his goals by appointing new members sympathetic to the New Deal - but it remained a good intention, as Roosevelt soon capitulated.
The reasons for this failure on the part of the President, who had set to work with such great momentum and fanfare, are not hard to see and can be summed up in a single phrase: Roosevelt was not a social revolutionary, but a democratic-capitalist reformer.
This reform program itself also lacked crucial elements for lasting success - an example: although he succeeded in pushing through a general increase in wages, he did not prevent the captains of industry from passing these additional costs on to consumers using tried-and-true capitalist methods; there was no price freeze, and as a result, the large sums that the state pumped into the economy through subsidies, pensions, and government contracts failed to bring about a sustained increase in purchasing power and, consequently, a lasting rise in production - big business, of course, did not fail to exploit this failure for propaganda purposes, accusing the government of useless “waste” of public funds.
Even as a capitalist himself and surrounded by capitalists, Roosevelt did not muster the courage and persuasive power to make the idea of a community of the people the guiding principle of economic policy as well and, drawing on it, to break the resistance of the plutocracy: nearly 25 million people received government assistance under Roosevelt’s social legislation, and yet the President was unable to harness this massive, loyal following politically and use it as a battering ram against the reactionaries.
Above all, however, there was no hint of a generous and far-sighted system of state economic planning, and as early as 1937, the crisis therefore returned in its familiar forms: unemployment figures rose rapidly, the production index fell to 1933 levels, and the New Deal increasingly gave way to inflation.

Nor did Roosevelt’s economic policy find any relief on the foreign trade front, though the leading figure in this field was not the President himself, but his Secretary of State, Hull, whose foreign trade policy was just as reactionary as Roosevelt’s New Deal policy was progressive.
All previous American administrations had pursued a policy of protective tariffs—but in 1934, Hull suddenly discovered the blessings of Old English-style free trade! At the very time when old-style world trade was collapsing everywhere and most nations were striving with all their might toward autarky—that is, economic self-sufficiency—the elderly man at the State Department in Washington was preaching the dismantling of tariff barriers and offering most-favored-nation treaties.
He made no secret of the fact that his primary goal was to increase North American exports, and indeed, between 1934 and 1939, he succeeded in concluding a series of trade agreements and increasing U.S. exports from 2.1 to 3.1 billion dollars, while imports rose only from 1.7 to 2.3 billion; however, the annual trade surplus of around 800 million dollars has not benefited the American economy, or only to a limited extent, for it merely increased the inflow of gold, which is so economically worthless that the U.S. government must “sterilize”—that is, store away—its immense gold reserves, which today account for 70 percent of the world’s gold supply.
The Roosevelt administration’s foreign trade policy also contributed to the deterioration of German-American relations: Cordell Hull found it highly disturbing that the German Reich showed no understanding for its outdated free-trade slogan, that it steadfastly continued its policy of bilateral exchange of goods, and that, through the clearing system, it also promoted the dethronement of gold; Hull

therefore persistently refused to enter into a most-favored-nation agreement with Germany, to the serious detriment of American farmers, whose wheat and cotton crops remained unsellable.
The fact that Cordell Hull—who initially did not agree at all with Roosevelt's hostile policy toward the Axis powers of Europe and at times clearly put the brakes on it—eventually fell completely in line with his master's position can likely be attributed largely to the failure of his trade policy, which he attributed to the new German methods.

One must simply imagine what it meant for a political careerist like Roosevelt that, in the very same years in which his own experiments failed one by one, Adolf Hitler's revolutionary social and economic policies were moving from success to success over in Europe; that in the U.S.—to cite just one figure—the army of unemployed swelled to 13 to 14 million, while in Germany it vanished entirely!
Purely theoretically, the President would indeed have had the opportunity to learn from Europe's experiences and attempt to apply "fascist" methods to his own country—if not literally, then at least in spirit; in practice, however, this possibility did not exist, for Roosevelt was and remained, at heart, committed to democratic capitalism and was therefore, just like Churchill, incapable of drawing useful lessons from the political ideas of the European revolution.
We consider the widespread explanation that the American people were not yet "ready" for a true revolution to be false, for a genuine, brilliant revolutionary creates the very platform for fulfilling his historic mission, no matter how great the resistance may be: the Führer should have proven this clearly enough in his struggle against a world of internal and external enemies.
Moreover, in their deep disappointment with the inaction of Republican administrations, the American people had initially placed an enormous amount of trust in Franklin Roosevelt, enough to carry him through even his second Presidential election, though by that time, in the fall of 1936, the "New Deal" policy had already all but failed: with this reservoir of trust and in possession of North America's inexhaustible economic resources, a true revolutionary could have accomplished tremendous feats.

Roosevelt, however, drew different conclusions from that embarrassing comparison of his failures with the successes of National Socialism: he sought in the European revolution a scapegoat and a lightning rod for his own failures, and soon after the Supreme Court's first ruling against the New Deal, the President began to pursue a foreign policy that grew increasingly zealous, diverting his people's attention from domestic hardships to alleged external threats.
Although he gave the impression that his sole goal was to spare the American people from involvement in a new European war, and although he still spoke primarily of protecting American neutrality, his famous "Quarantine Speech" in Chicago on October 5,th 1937[11], revealed his true orientation for the first time.

[11] In this speech, Roosevelt derides "aggressor nations" and directly confronted America's isolationist policies of the time. - The Translator

4. In the Spotlight of "Neutrality"

Two factors were decisive when Roosevelt shifted his focus from domestic reform to a very active foreign policy around 1937: the failure of the New Deal as a factor influencing public sentiment, and the need to stimulate the economy, which had once again fallen into crisis, by any means necessary.
The President calculated that if he could divert the people's attention from the failures of his domestic policies to impending external threats, he would not only strengthen his government's position, but also, at the same time, persuade Congress to allocate large sums for rearmament, thereby giving the national economy a significant boost.
The major obstacle to this new course, however, was the American people's fierce reluctance to allow themselves to be dragged once again—as in 1917—into the maelstrom of overseas turmoil with their money and property, and possibly even with their blood and lives: so-called isolationism was in full bloom, and the popular slogan was "neutrality."
Despite the most assiduous efforts of Anglo-Jewish agitation, it had by that time still not succeeded in clouding the sound judgment of the American people with the slogan that the "imperialism" of the European "dictators" sought not only to conquer Europe, but also to dominate the "Western Hemisphere", for as long as there was no sense of a threat to American soil, it was impossible to secure the enormous sums needed for large-scale rearmament or to overcome the economic crisis.
The President had to take this situation into account, as only step by step could he hope to steer the ship of state in the direction he desired - thus, at that time, Roosevelt presumably quietly devised a long-term policy that was to unfold in three stages:

1. Defending against the threat that America's geopolitical and economic interests in the Pacific region were allegedly facing from Japan.
2. Repelling the dangers that allegedly threatened South and Central America from both Asia and Europe.
3. Repelling the attacks with which the alleged dream of world domination by the totalitarian European powers—and Germany in particular—threatened all of the Americas.

For the first of these three stages, the President could hope for broad understanding from the American public, since Japan's rise to become a modern great power had been viewed with suspicion by the North American people for decades—even by those circles and social strata that were opposed to U.S. intervention in European affairs; an anti-Japanese policy was therefore, to a certain extent, genuinely "popular," and resistance was to be expected only from the capitalist groups that profited from the extensive Japanese-American trade relations.
It was considerably more difficult, in contrast, for the President to convince public opinion of the dangers supposedly threatening South and Central America, for the average Yankee was sober-minded enough to regard a Japanese attack across the Pacific and a simultaneous attack by Germany and Italy across the Atlantic against the southern part of the "Western Hemisphere" as a mere scare tactic; added to this was the fact that the Latin American states themselves made it clear that they felt less threatened by the "dictatorships" than by so-called Yankee imperialism, which, while making them many fine promises, was ultimately unable to replace the time-tested trade relations between Latin American countries and Europe.

Although North American-Jewish propaganda unleashed a massive campaign of agitation in the South American countries, and Roosevelt's Treasury spared no expense on bonds and bribes, none of the Pan-American conferences that Roosevelt convened yielded the major result Washington had hoped for: an all-American alliance of defense and resistance against the "evils" from overseas.
By far the most difficult task, however, was winning over the American people to a policy of active intervention in Europe, and the President therefore temporarily set this third and most important agenda item entirely aside.

Indeed, he began his presidency by paying homage to isolationism and gave the impression that safeguarding America from entanglement in the European turmoil was the true, ultimate goal of his policy - thus, Roosevelt became a champion of American "neutrality."
As early as August 1935, when he enacted the first Neutrality Act, which prohibited the export of arms to belligerents, he unequivocally committed himself to neutrality:

"I have approved this joint resolution of Congress because it was intended as an expression of the firm desire of the government and the citizens of the United States to avoid any action that might involve us in a war - our intention is absolutely clear..."

Half a year later, in his New Year's Message to Congress on January 3rd, 1936, the President declared:

"Above all, we refuse to encourage the waging of war by allowing the belligerents to obtain arms, ammunition, and war materiel from the United States."

Upon extending the 1935 arms export ban, he also solemnly reaffirmed to Congress on February 29th, 1936, that this law had been a "definitive step" toward maintaining American neutrality.

In light of the U.S. government's later stance, the statement made by Secretary of State Hull before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 17th, 1936, reads even more grotesquely:

"We cannot understand how a neutral party can systematically help fan the flames of war by directly supplying belligerents with essential materials, for in doing so, it not only helps to prolong the war but also to drag it out indefinitely: no one knows better than we do that with every day the war is prolonged, the danger of its spread would grow, along with the increased risk that we would be drawn into it...
The Neutrality Act is based on the view that if our country were to become a base for military supplies for any belligerent, there would be a tendency to create an atmosphere of non-neutrality and, ultimately, to help drag us into the war."

Roosevelt himself declared as late as August 1936 in his campaign speech at Chautauqua:

"We are isolationists insofar as we seek to completely isolate America from war.
I hate war; I wish I could keep it away from all nations, but that is beyond my power - however, I can ensure that no American action provokes or promotes a war."

This was proclaimed by the same man whose stance in 1939 ultimately encouraged England and France to declare war on Germany; the same man who, through his policy of aid to England, was ultimately the sole factor in prolonging the European war.
But he said even more back then in Chautauqua:

"If war were to break out on another continent, there would be thousands of people in America who, in search of quick riches—of fool's gold—would set out to destroy or circumvent our neutrality: they will tell you that if they could produce this and that and ship it to the belligerents, all the unemployed in America would find work; they will tell you that if they were allowed to extend credit to the belligerents, that credit would be used in the United States to build houses and factories and to pay off our debts."

A short time later, Roosevelt himself joined these wicked people and became their leader.

Later, when the President was fighting against his own Neutrality Act and striving to repeal it, he issued a statement saying that he had made a "mistake" in 1935, and that he regretted the law because it was "incompatible with true, traditional American neutrality"; however, this does not in the least alter the fact that Roosevelt and Hull, in 1935 and 1936, clearly and correctly predicted where the policy of the war profiteers was bound to lead the United States: toward non-neutrality and into the maelstrom of war.
As early as 1937, the shift was also carried out publicly: first, Roosevelt had the Neutrality Act amended so that the President could determine at his own discretion whether two states were at war with each other or not; this seemingly insignificant provision was not unimportant, since in the period following the First World War, wars had repeatedly been started without a formal declaration of war.
When he pushed through this amendment, Roosevelt was likely also considering the possibility of a new Geneva sanctions war against "aggressor powers"—one that could be presented as a "police action" and would allow him to unilaterally supply arms to the guardians of international morality.

In the "Quarantine Speech" delivered in Chicago on October 5th, 1937, the President finally distinguished, for the first time before the entire world, between "peace-loving" and "aggressor" nations: for the first time, he lumped Japan, Italy, and Germany together, even though the Reich had not yet committed any "aggression" up to that point, but had instead tirelessly advocated for an amicable and peaceful resolution of international disputes.
The "Quarantine Speech" of October 1937 must therefore be recalled time and again, because Anglo-Saxon propaganda subsequently claimed that it was only the German invasion of Austria in February 1938 that prompted Washington and London to change their policy - however, since the American President, as we described in the first section of this article, had already adopted an unmistakably partisan stance on the issue of disarmament in the early days of his administration, the Chicago speech—and this is how it was perceived by the entire world at the time—constituted an open declaration of war against the rising powers, which, in Roosevelt's words, were to be "placed in quarantine," that is, excluded from American supplies.

5. Preparing for a Change of Course

Roosevelt's decision to abandon the U.S. policy of neutrality—which he had only reluctantly gone along with—was set in stone after the Chicago speech; however, the isolationist sentiment among the American people still forced him to exercise the utmost caution, and he therefore adopted the following strategy: on the one hand, propaganda against the totalitarian powers continued with increased intensity, and on the other hand, Washington's commitment to the principle of neutrality was earnestly emphasized.
Indeed, in May 1938—following a fierce campaign in the press and on the radio against Germany's resolution of the Austrian question—the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sumner Welles, declared before a church assembly that the cause of world peace and the preservation of peace for America would not be advanced by American involvement in international polemics and accusations against the domestic policies of other nations, which were rightfully none of America's business: this semi-official statement astonished the American public all the more because, shortly before, two other members of the President's staff—Secretary of the Interior [Harold] Ickes and Secretary of War [Harry] Woodring—had made the most outrageous attacks against the authoritarian governments of Europe and had personally insulted the Führer in their speeches.
Was Roosevelt now preparing a new tactical shift? Did he intend to return to the official policy of neutrality from 1935? The *Völkischer Beobachter*, in its May 26th, 1938, issue, warned against premature optimism:

"It remains to be seen whether the change of course now becoming apparent truly signifies a return to honest neutrality, or whether it merely serves to temporarily reassure the American people, who have been greatly unsettled by the European events of the past few days."

Soon afterward, it became clear that German mistrust was all too justified, for in June 1938, Senator [Key] Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had already announced that Congress would be asked to amend the Arms Export Act - thus, a complete revision of American neutrality policy was imminent.
This was a trial balloon to gauge public opinion—and it failed! The American public reacted so negatively that Roosevelt backed down once again: the people were still not ready.

We still lack documentary evidence today regarding the role U.S. diplomacy played during the Austrian and Sudeten crises, but we do know, however, that Washington was furious about the Ostmark's return to the Reich, and we also know—again from the Roosevelt camp—that there was a constant back-and-forth of coded telegrams and telephone calls between Washington and Paris, where Roosevelt's closest diplomatic confidant, Bullitt, was now serving as ambassador.
Roosevelt's official advisors at the State Department, however, warned against an overly close relationship with France, explicitly citing American public opinion - Roosevelt relented only reluctantly, as Alsop and Kintner describes:

"Sitting in his Oval Office among his ship paintings, devouring dispatches, directing everything himself amid incessant telephone calls with Europe, the President sometimes seethes with frustration at the need for caution.

Almost daily, he asks Bullitt in Paris, Kennedy in London, Hugh Wilson in Berlin, and William Phillips in Rome if there is anything he can do to come to their aid: 'Nothing,' is the answer, 'unless we want to commit ourselves.' - in light of American public opinion, a binding commitment was simply impossible."[12]

At least from the Munich Conference in September 1938 onward, America's diplomatic weight tipped the scales toward intransigence, and Roosevelt's behavior at that time was highly revealing: the very moment news arrived from Munich that the Sudeten Agreement had been signed, the President hastened to emphasize his role in this peaceful solution, but just 24 hours later, after it became clear—contrary to Washington's initial assumption that Hitler had "capitulated"—that the German position on the Sudeten question had been fully enforced, a furious tirade began in Washington against the "appeasers," who had once again backed down in the face of the dictators.
Chamberlain and Daladier were virtually branded by the U.S. press as traitors to the cause of democracy worldwide, and in their *American White Paper*, Alsop and Kintner describe in detail how, starting with the Munich Agreement, Roosevelt's diplomatic envoys were instructed to oppose any further concessions by the Western powers to "fascist" demands, and to threaten Germany with American support in the event of war:

"In Berlin, Ambassador Wilson was instructed to use every opportunity, however unofficial, to convince the Wilhelmstraße that any further German act of aggression would have the gravest repercussions in the United States; Bullitt in Paris, Kennedy in London, and other American envoys in various capitals were also always on hand with the same message for every German ear."

In other words: Roosevelt instructed his ambassadors in Europe to intimidate the German government by any means necessary, and to dangle the full support of the U.S. before the two hesitant Western democratic powers, provided they remained steadfast: "To stop Hitler"—"Hitler stoppen"—was and remained the White House's central foreign policy slogan.

The assassination of Counselor [Ernst] von Rath in Paris by the Jew [Herschel] Grünspan, and the subsequent German outburst of rage against the Jews then gave the President the long-awaited opportunity to intensify the tension between the American and German peoples - to cite the *American White Paper*:

"The American public recoiled in horror at the news from Berlin, and the President saw his chance! At the State Department, some of the senior officials recommended only a written expression of disapproval directed at Hitler, but the President overruled them - thus, on November 13th, Ambassador Hugh Wilson was recalled from Berlin by telegram."

Two days later, Roosevelt personally added fuel to the fire by declaring:

"The news of the past few days from Germany has deeply outraged public opinion in the United States, though such news would provoke the same deep reaction among the American people if it came from any other country.

[12] *American White Paper* by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, New York 1940

I myself could hardly believe that such monstrous things were still possible in our 20th-century civilization: to obtain a firsthand picture of the situation in Germany, I have instructed the Secretary of State to immediately recall our ambassador in Berlin for a report and consultation."

Just how insincere this melodramatic statement by the President was can be gauged simply from the fact that Roosevelt had never uttered a word of abhorrence for the unspeakable atrocities committed by the Reds in Spain, compared to which the destruction of Jewish businesses and synagogues in Germany was completely harmless - indeed, Roosevelt, just like his Democratic brethren in London and Paris, had quite bluntly taken sides with the Reds and against national Spain, and his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, had not been ashamed to accept stolen Spanish works of art as a gift from Spain's Red "ambassador."
Roosevelt is too clever for anyone to assume that, with his brazen interference in Germany's internal affairs, he merely intended to warn Berlin and persuade it to adopt a more peaceful policy, as he could count on one hand that his gesture would achieve the opposite: the sole purpose of his "outrage" was to stir up the American public in order to finally prepare public opinion for the abandonment of the policy of neutrality.
This idea runs like a common thread through all of Roosevelt's foreign policy initiatives during those months; it should also be recalled that the Democrats, Roosevelt's party, suffered a severe defeat in the first days of November 1938 in special elections for Congress, a defeat that jeopardized Roosevelt's position of power and made a foreign policy distraction doubly desirable.

6. The Bullitt System

Around the turn of the year 1938–39, Polish government documents also began to speak for themselves—documents that Foreign Minister Józef Beck kindly forgot to take with him when he fled Warsaw in September 1939, and which fell into our hands intact.
Taken as a whole, these documents[13] constitute overwhelming evidence of guilt regarding U.S. foreign policy under Roosevelt, for these diplomatic reports were written by Polish ambassadors who both hated and feared Germany, and were therefore entirely above suspicion in terms of their commitment to democracy.

The following emerges clearly from the Polish documents:

1. The U.S. ambassador in Paris, William Bullitt, was—due to his close personal friendship with Roosevelt—effectively the President's special envoy for all of Europe: Roosevelt paid full attention to his advice and reports, and Bullitt always acted in accordance with the President's specific, confidential instructions.
He was even able to issue direct instructions to the other American ambassadors in Europe, who—like Kennedy in London—were by no means always delighted by this: this observation is important because it lends particular weight to Bullitt's conversations and actions, which constitute the main content of the Polish secret documents - thus, through Bullitt's words, Roosevelt himself spoke!

We reproduce here a few passages from the Polish documents that illustrate Bullitt's position:

In Count Potocki's telegram of November 21st, 1938, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, it states:

"Since Bullitt constantly keeps President Roosevelt informed about the international situation in Europe..., his reports are received with great attention by President Roosevelt and the State Department."

On January 16th, 1939, Count Potocki telegraphed the following, among other things, to his minister:

"The day before yesterday, I had a lengthy conversation with Ambassador Bullitt at the embassy, where he visited me.
B. is traveling to Paris on the 21st of this month, after having been absent for nearly three months; he is taking with him a whole 'suitcase' full of instructions, discussions, and directives from President Roosevelt, the State Department, and the senators who serve on the Foreign Relations Committee."

The Polish ambassador in Paris, Jules Lukasiewicz, telegraphed to Warsaw on March 29th, 1939:

"The following day, the 25th of this month, Ambassador Bullitt informed me that he had adopted my views and, exercising the rights vested in him, had instructed the U.S. Ambassador in London, Kennedy,

[13] Published by the Foreign Office as White Paper No. 3, "Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges" (*Polish Documents on the Prehistory of the War*), popular edition, Berlin 1940, Zentralverlag der NSDAP.

to visit Prime Minister Chamberlain at his residence this Saturday and to repeat all of this to him, while categorically emphasizing the responsibility of the British government."

2. Bullitt, Roosevelt's friend and confidant, hated Germany and its Führer with a passion, and saw his primary task as undermining German policy: the Polish reports provide clear evidence of this.
Here is an example: regarding his conversation with Bullitt on November 19th, 1938, Ambassador Count Potocki reported the following in a telegram dated November 21st, 1938:

"He spoke of Germany and Chancellor Hitler with the utmost vehemence and intense hatred; he stated that only strength—specifically, at the end of a war—could put an end to Germany's reckless expansion in the future."

3. To achieve his goal, Bullitt urged the ministers and diplomats of the European powers to categorically reject any and all demands—even the most reasonable ones—made by the totalitarian powers in the future: in particular, he worked against an Italian-French understanding and against a peaceful resolution of the Danzig question.
He also recommended putting pressure on the British Chamberlain government—which he considered too willing to compromise—to make it take a firmer stance - the Polish documents also provide overwhelming evidence of this:
In his conversation with Ambassador Count Potocki on November 19th, 1938, in Washington—which the Polish diplomat reported in his telegram of November 21st, 1938—Bullitt described the Munich Agreement, signed just a few weeks earlier, as a "capitulation of the democratic states", and lamented "Britain's complete lack of preparedness for war and the impossibility of converting British industry to mass war production, particularly in the field of aviation..."
Potocki continues:

"When I asked him how he envisioned this coming war, he replied that, above all, the United States, France, and Britain would have to arm themselves massively in order to stand up to German power: only then, when the time is right [Bullitt continued], will it be possible to proceed to the final decision."

"In the meantime, Germany would presumably press ahead with its expansion eastward; it would be the desire of the democratic states that armed conflicts break out in the East between the German Reich and Russia.
Since the Soviet Union's military potential is unknown, it could be that Germany would stray too far from its base and be condemned to a long and debilitating war: only then, as Bullitt suggests, would the democratic states attack Germany and force it to surrender."

That this is by no means a matter of Bullitt's personal wishes, which carry no weight, but rather the official policy of the Roosevelt administration, is demonstrated by the following sentences from Potocki's telegram of January 12th, 1939:

"President Roosevelt was the first to express hatred of fascism, and in doing so, he pursued a twofold purpose:

1. He wanted to divert the American people's attention from difficult and complex domestic political problems, above all from the conflict between capital and labor.

2. By creating a war-like atmosphere and spreading rumors of a threat looming over Europe, he sought to persuade the American people to accept America's enormous rearmament program, which goes far beyond the defensive needs of the United States."

"The approach was quite simple: one only had to, on the one hand, properly highlight the threat of war hanging over the world because of Chancellor Hitler, and on the other hand, one had to conjure up a specter that rambled on about an attack by totalitarian states on the United States.
The Munich Agreement came very conveniently to President Roosevelt: he portrayed it as a capitulation by France and England in the face of belligerent German militarism."

Four days later, on January 16th, 1939, Count Potocki telegraphed his superior in Warsaw:

"The content of the directives ***[from the President - T. S.]*** *that Bullitt outlined to me during our half-hour conversation is as follows:*

1. A revitalization of foreign policy under the leadership of President Roosevelt, who sharply and unambiguously condemns the totalitarian states.

2. The United States' war preparations at sea, on land, and in the air, which are being carried out at an accelerated pace and are consuming the colossal sum of 1,250,000,000 dollars.

3. The President's firm view that France and England must put an end to any policy of compromise with the totalitarian states; that they should not engage in any discussions with them aimed at altering territorial boundaries.

4. A moral assurance that the United States is abandoning its policy of isolation and is prepared, in the event of war, to intervene actively on the side of England and France; America is prepared to place all its financial and raw material resources at their disposal."

In the first days of February 1939—this document bears no date, but does contain marginal notes from Warsaw dated February 7th—the Paris ambassador, Lukasiewicz, telegraphed the following as the opinion of the decisive factors in Washington after two meetings with Bullitt, who had just returned from Washington:

"Italy's claims against France are utterly devoid of any basis or arguments that could even partially justify them; France therefore cannot and must not make any further apparent concessions, for any yielding on France's part would undermine its prestige in Africa - thus, any potential compromise at the expense of French interests must therefore be ruled out.
Theoretically speaking, there is a fear that England might, together with Berlin, attempt to force France—at a moment of tension—into a compromise incompatible with its own interests: in such a case, however, France will be able to count on Washington's strong support.

The United States has at its disposal various and immensely significant means of pressure against England; the mere threat of their use should suffice to deter England from pursuing a policy of compromise at France's expense."

"The attitude of influential American figures toward Italy and Germany is negative, primarily because they believe that the recent successes of the Rome–Berlin Axis—which have undermined both the prestige and the authority of France and England as imperial powers—almost immediately threaten the real interests of the United States - thus, Washington's foreign policy will also work against any further development of the situation in this direction."

"For the time being, I would like to refrain from formulating my own opinion regarding Ambassador Bullitt's statements, as my intention is, in fact, to obtain some additional explanations from him first. One thing, however, seems certain to me: namely, that President Roosevelt's policy in the near future will be aimed at supporting France's resistance, curbing German-Italian pressure, and weakening England's inclination toward compromise."

4. Roosevelt used every means at his disposal to stoke the war hysteria in the United States, but at the same time deceived the American people thoroughly by swearing solemnly that under no circumstances would he allow the U.S. to become involved in the coming war.
Potocki's telegram of November 21st, 1938—which has already been cited here several times—states:

"In response to my question as to whether the United States would participate in such a war, Bullitt replied: 'Undoubtedly yes, but only after England and France have made the first move!' The mood in the United States, he said, is so tense toward Nazism and Hitlerism that a psychosis similar to that which prevailed before America's declaration of war on Germany in 1917 already prevails among Americans today."

Particularly revealing in this context—and at the same time providing an overview of Roosevelt's foreign policy—is the secret report by Ambassador Count Potocki dated March 7th, 1939, which is not yet included in the *German White Paper* No. 3; it was published by the *Völkischer Beobachter* on October 27th, 1940, after Bullitt had sought to defend himself a few days earlier in a speech in Chicago against the accusation that he and other American diplomats in Europe had pressured England and France to declare war on Germany.
As we read in this report sent one week before the German invasion of Prague:

"The foreign policy of the United States is currently a matter of concern not only to the government, but also to the entire American public.
First and foremost, this concerns the statements made by President Roosevelt, who, in almost every public speech, points out—more or less explicitly—the need to take a more active foreign policy stance in the face of the chaos of ideas and trends in Europe; these statements are picked up by the press and then skillfully instilled in the minds of the average American to reinforce the entire population's preconceived notions, and in doing so, they always strike the same chord, namely—the danger of war in Europe and the rescue of democracies from being overwhelmed by hostile fascism..."

"The consequence of these speeches is a call for rearmament and the allocation of enormous sums to the navy and the air force, as behind this lies the unambiguous idea that, in the event of an armed conflict, the United States cannot remain on the sidelines, but must take an active part in the hostilities.

The result of President Roosevelt's forceful words—which rely on the press—is today a deliberate effort to sway the American public toward hatred of anything that smacks of totalitarianism and fascism... All information from diplomatic missions as well as from the President's special envoys—in the form of United States ambassadors—is diligently reviewed by the State Department and by the President himself; the President frequently summons his representatives abroad to Washington for personal exchanges of views and to receive special information and instructions...

The President personally issues instructions to his representatives abroad, most of whom are his personal friends: in this way, the United States is being led down the dangerous path of world politics with the express intention of departing from the comfortable policy of isolation.

Personally, the President views his country's foreign policy as a means of satisfying his own ambition, and he gladly listens to the echoes that reverberate back to him from the other capitals of the world..."

Count Potocki concludes his lengthy secret report:

"In summary, the technical and moral preparation of the American people for participation in a war is progressing rapidly, and it appears that from the very outset the United States will come to the aid of France and Great Britain with all its might - however, I also know the American public and the representatives and senators who have the final say, and I believe that the likelihood of America entering the war as it did in 1917 is not great, for the majority of states in the Midwest and West, where the rural element predominates, do not want to be drawn into European disputes at any cost: they remember the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles as well as the well-known phrase that the war was intended to secure democracy throughout the world.

Neither the Treaty of Versailles nor this slogan has reconciled the United States with the war, and for many millions of people, only a bitter aftertaste remains because of the billions in unpaid debts that European nations owe the United States."

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All of this is set out in black and white in the secret reports from the Polish ambassadors to the Warsaw government, and since the originals of these documents were published in facsimile in the third *German White Paper,* and were also viewed by foreign diplomats and journalists at the Foreign Office in Berlin, their authenticity was never doubted from the outset by any informed politician in the world; Count Potocki, under pressure from the State Department in Washington, did go so far as to issue a feeble denial of authorship of his telegrams, but, significantly, he was relieved of his post after a "grace period" had expired.

That the Polish ambassadors—Lukasiewicz's telegrams from Paris are characterized by particular clarity and wisdom—did not misquote Bullitt and were not chasing after figments of the imagination can be conclusively proven by comparing the individual documents: these reports from Washington, Paris, and London complement each other wonderfully and show that all three ambassadors had arrived at the same assessment independently of one another, and they also show that Bullitt's warmongering actions were

mostly successful; it is also particularly striking how the hesitant Chamberlain was slowly but surely driven by Bullitt's intrigues into the dead end of the Polish-British alliance.

In short, the Polish documents prove that Roosevelt's diplomacy bore a huge, if not the greatest, share of the blame for the outbreak of the British war.
The Polish documents also refute the claim made by Anglo-Saxon propaganda that the "major shift" in democratic policy toward encirclement and war did not occur until mid-March 1939—that is, after the German invasion of Prague: the ambassadorial reports on Bullitt's machinations are, without exception, dated prior to this alleged cut-off date, and they follow closely on the heels of the Munich Agreement, which was perceived and praised not only by the peoples of Europe, but also by its democratic signatories themselves as an instrument of peace and not, by any means, as an example of "aggression."

7. Toward War in Europe

Between Munich and Prague—that is, before the so-called "turning point"—there was also that hateful New Year's message from the President on January 3rd, 1939, which discouraged all warmongers and stated:

"Words may be useless, but war is not the only means of enforcing a decent respect for the opinion of humankind: there are many methods short of war that are stronger and more effective than mere words in conveying the sentiments of our people to aggressor governments.
At the very least, we can and should avoid any action or inaction that encourages or supports the aggressor."

In the camp of American isolationism, the meaning of these threats had been well understood - as Hamilton Fish, the long-time leader of a purely American policy in the House of Representatives that shunned foreign adventures, explained in a radio address:

"The totalitarian states have not the slightest thought of waging war against us or invading Latin America: I have no intention of mincing words when the life, liberty, and happiness of our people are at stake.
The time has come to call a halt to the New Deal warmongers—backed by war profiteers, communists, and hysterical internationalists—who want us to play the role of the world's policeman with American blood and money and to place the world under quarantine!"

Shortly thereafter, in February 1939, it came to light purely by chance that the President had secretly instructed the U.S. Army to demonstrate and sell new American bomber models and Curtiss P-36 fighters to a French commission: it was only the fatal crash of a French pilot off the American coast that drew public attention to this dangerous deal, which Bullitt had orchestrated in Paris.
A storm of indignation then erupted, especially in the Senate Armed Services Committee; Roosevelt attempted to quell the uproar by inviting a number of leading senators and representatives to the White House and tried to paint a bleak picture of the situation in Europe - Alsop and Kintner describe this confidential meeting in their *White Book* with the following words:

"The President misjudged his audience: he began by painting a bleak picture of Europe, describing German objectives in the most vivid terms—that Hitler would not be trifled with, that war was imminent, and that war, he gestured to the listening senators, would directly affect the peace and security of the United States.
The current struggle, he continued, is for control of Europe, but as soon as one nation controls Europe, that nation will be in a position to turn its attention to the Western Hemisphere."

This unrestrained doomsday rhetoric, however, had the opposite effect, for it only heightened the senators' suspicion that the President was steering America into a European war.
The President had made similar remarks shortly before in a closed-door session of the Senate Armed Services Committee, applying Baldwin's infamous phrase about "English borders on the Rhine" to the

United States; this preposterous theory further inflamed the outrage of broad segments of the American public.
Roosevelt now resorted to flimsy excuses and claimed—amid brazen insults directed at the senators and part of the press—that he had been "misquoted"; at the same time, he issued a statement on his policy that was noncommittal in substance but disguised as neutral.

Just a few weeks later, he launched a new maneuver to unsettle the American people: before his departure for the naval exercises in mid-February 1939, he made cryptic remarks to members of the press suggesting that "threatening news from abroad" might force him to return to Washington prematurely"; Hull's State Department, which was subsequently bombarded with inquiries, meanwhile had to declare that it knew of no threatening reports from Europe.
Hull's officials, of course, knew that their source was none other than Mr. Bullitt in Paris, but they could not reveal this if they did not want to expose the President's personal political agenda.

All these machinations are typical of Roosevelt's efforts to constantly preoccupy his country's public opinion with foreign policy "dangers" in order to win support for amending the Neutrality Act and, at the same time, to divert attention from the regime's domestic failures.
Along the same lines were the tireless efforts to stir up Latin America and frighten it with the threat of a "fifth column" - thus, to cite just one example of this kind from a wealth of material, in early February 1939, during a lecture before the "Association for the Study of Foreign Policy," Charles Thomson spread the rumor that Germany had a keen interest in the secession of the state of Rio Grande do Sul from the Brazilian confederation—a hoax that was widely circulated not only in Brazil but also in Argentina with the help of a press loyal to the Yankees.
Despite all this, however, the Neutrality Act was not repealed, not even after the Prague incident; nor was it repealed after Roosevelt sent that insolent telegram to the Führer and the Duce on April 14th, 1939, which contained the following grotesque inquiry:

"Are you prepared to give an assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran?"

In his famous reply to the Reichstag on April 28th, 1939, the Führer devastatingly exposed the brazen audacity of this "question", and among other things, he pointed out that some of the nations mentioned by Roosevelt were by no means "independent," but were instead occupied by the armed forces of democratic states—namely, England and France—and deprived of their rights; he further drew the attention of the windbag in Washington to the fact that he had made several historical errors, since some of these countries—such as Ireland and Palestine—had never been threatened by Germany, but had been and continue to be oppressed by England.
The Führer also ironically rejected Roosevelt's bold offer to mediate between Germany and the entire host of peoples and countries allegedly threatened by the Reich—on the grounds that the United States was not involved in Europe's current conflicts and was therefore neutral—by referring to Wilson, that other American President who had once also played the role of the honest broker.

The political purpose of Roosevelt's telegram of April 14th was, nevertheless, at least partially achieved, for it was precisely during the days of April 1939 that Roosevelt's and Bullitt's efforts had borne fruit in London—England had finally openly begun its policy of encirclement against the Reich.
The purpose of the telegram was to lend support to this policy and to show the whole world that the U.S. approved of it and was participating in it; furthermore, Roosevelt hoped to achieve considerable public success in America itself by publicly demonstrating how to deal with "these dictators."
However, the vain man in the White House had not anticipated such a crushing rebuff as the one the Führer delivered to him fourteen days later, and to this day, he has failed to provide a response to the Reichstag speech of April 28th, 1939.
It was not until five weeks later, in early June 1939, that Sumner Welles, Hull's Deputy Secretary of State, took the opportunity of a speech to students at Columbia University to defend his boss's telegram—without, however, daring to address the Führer's assertions in any way.

In the summer of 1939, as the Danzig issue became increasingly acute, Roosevelt's envoys in Europe—Bullitt in Paris, Kennedy in London, and Biddle in Warsaw—diligently continued the policy of encouraging the democracies to resist the Reich: we owe our fairly good knowledge of this, among other things, to the invention of the telephone and the loquaciousness of the gentlemen mentioned...
In June, the President then sent one of his trusted Jews, Representative Sol Bloom, to the parliamentary front to finally overturn the Neutrality Act of 1935; however, the isolationists prevailed once again, albeit by a narrow majority of 159 to 157 votes, and in repelling Roosevelt's push, one of his own party colleagues, the Democrat [Martin] Sweeny, bluntly accused the President of wanting to plunge the American people into a new world war.
Sweeny evoked the memory of that memorable Good Friday in 1917, when President Wilson steered Congress into the First World War:

"I have received the following information from members of Congress who were present at the time and voted for the war: 'Loyalty to the Democratic Party' was the watchword, and this completely misled some members of Congress regarding the gravity of the issues under debate.
Postmaster General Burleson entered the chamber, took several representatives into the coatroom over there, and said, 'Boys, this whole thing is just a bluff; we're bluffing the Kaiser and the Central Powers—no American boy is going to Europe. Vote for this bill! And by the way, if any of you have any requests, I can reward you with a postmaster's position or some other office.'"

Sweeny added that the representatives who voted for the war at that time had confided in him:

"...that they have visions in their dreams, and are haunted by images of horror until their last breath, because they feel the blood of 67,000 dead American sons on their hands."

8. The Seed Takes Root

It would have been unreasonable to expect Franklin D. Roosevelt, on September 3, 1939, when England and France declared war on the Reich, to publicly acknowledge the role he had played in bringing about that war; however, the fact that, at this dark moment in history, he stepped before the world in the guise of a prophet who had been proven right—that he triumphantly declared to his domestic political opponents, "I predicted this disaster"—was, after all, rather presumptuous.

His radio address to the American people on the evening of Britain's declaration of war was also a masterful performance: while we still lack documentary evidence regarding the activities of U.S. diplomacy during the decisive hours of September 1st and 2nd, when the question was whether England and France would unleash a European war over Danzig, Roosevelt's entire stance up to that point, as reflected in the Polish documents, leaves no room for doubt that the American President pressed London and Paris by every means to declare war on the Reich.
And yet, even if he had truly remained silent at the last moment, the following sentence from his radio message would still constitute a falsification of history:

"It is only right and proper that I remind you of the persistent and sometimes successful efforts of your government, which have thrown the full weight of the United States into the scales of peace."

The Polish Bullitt documents attest to the contrary.

Roosevelt did not yet dare to openly portray Germany as the "aggressor", but when, at this fateful hour, he invoked the New Testament, which "forbids the use of force, of armed force, of marching armies, and of falling bombs"; when he hammered home to the people that this European war also "affected" every American home; when he said he "hoped" indeed, he "believed" that the United States would not be drawn into this war, and if, at the very same moment, he granted every American the right "not to be neutral in thought"—then it was immediately clear where the President of the United States stood on the evening of the British declaration of war and where he was headed.

It was therefore no surprise when Roosevelt immediately set about undermining American neutrality—a move he had so zealously prepared for through propaganda over the past two years, for his war slogan was: aid for the democratic powers in Europe, aid by any means "right up to the brink of war"!
A small episode best illustrates this policy: immediately before the outbreak of war, the President personally ordered the detention of the Norddeutscher Lloyd steamer "Bremen" in New York under flimsy pretexts, apparently for the purpose of handing the valuable ship over to the British: the fact that the giant German steamship nevertheless escaped—thus thwarting this shabby trick—may be seen, just like Churchill's equally ill-fated scheme shortly thereafter to torpedo the "Athenia,"[14] as an early symbol that "democracy" would meet its match in this war.

[14] The "Athenia" was actually sunk by the Germans, albeit mistakenly, as the submarine U-30's commander, Fritz-Julius Lemp, mistook it for a troop carrier - nevertheless, this attack was covered up until it was admitted to in 1946 during the Nuremberg Trials. - The Translator

Just fourteen days after the war began, the President had finalized the draft amendment to the Neutrality Act of 1935: its central provision was the repeal of the ban on arms exports to belligerents, which deprived U.S. capitalism of huge profits and England and France of vital American supplies of war materiel.

Roosevelt seems to have originally intended to scrap the Neutrality Act entirely, but as we again learn from the work by Alsop and Kintner, he was emphatically advised by congressional party leaders that the arms embargo had to be replaced by some other provision in order to prevent America's entanglement in the European war.

Roosevelt's justification for the alleged necessity of amending the law is so amusing in its shrewdness that it is worth repeating here: in his message to Congress dated September 21st, 1939, he sought, with the help of flimsy historical and international law arguments, to convince Congress that the 1935 arms export ban not only violated American tradition, but was also "extremely dangerous" to the neutrality, security, and peace of the United States; at the same time, however, he clearly appealed to the American plutocracy's greed for war profits—which he had described four years earlier as "fool's gold"—by asking:

"What advantage is there for the U.S., from a purely material standpoint, in sending raw materials and semi-finished goods for the war effort across the ocean, when we could employ thousands with them and, through such employment, automatically aid our own national defense?"

It was not the delivery of arms itself that was dangerous, he argued, but only their shipment on American ships, which endangered American citizens - in short, everything that Roosevelt and Hull had argued in 1935 and 1936 in favor of the first Neutrality Act was now portrayed as wrong and dangerous.

Roosevelt now extolled to Congress, in effusive terms, the "Cash and Carry" clause, which prohibits the sale of American war materiel on credit and its transport on American ships - now, since the new law also prohibited American ships and citizens from traveling into European war zones altogether, public opinion in the U.S.—despite all the warnings from those who knew or suspected Roosevelt's true intentions—saw no threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere in the revised Neutrality Act: the law seemed to rule out a recurrence of incidents—such as the "Lusitania" and "Sussex" cases—that had provided the pretext for the U.S. entry into the First World War, and since foreign buyers would henceforth have to pay for war materiel in cash, the American people also seemed protected against the danger of once again having to sacrifice billions on the altar of "democracy," of which they would never see a cent returned.

Nevertheless, the new Neutrality Act was already a one-sided endorsement of the democratic allies, for it excluded Germany—due to its meager foreign exchange reserves and the weakness of its battleship fleet—from acquiring and shipping American war materiel, while England, thanks to its large fleet and its seemingly inexhaustible overseas capital reserves, could purchase as much American war materiel as it wished and ship it across the Atlantic.

Yet the President said not a word of this to his country - instead, he asserted all the more emphatically in his message to Congress that America's peace alone was the purpose and goal of the new law:

"I tell you with deep and unshakable conviction that by lifting the embargo, the United States is more likely to preserve peace than if the law remains as it is today: I say this because the U.S. government will clearly and definitively insist that every U.S. citizen and every U.S. ship stay away from the immediate danger of current conflict zones."

We saw how this solemn “clear and definitive” promise was then fulfilled in practice during the winter of 1940–41, when Roosevelt championed his law of unconditional and unrestricted aid to England...

The message of September 21st, 1939, concluded with the following grandiloquent statement:

“May the American people, at a time when it is sometimes said that free speech is no longer compatible with national security, show the world through their actions that we of the United States are of one mind, one heart, and one clear resolve—a people who walk before God in the light of humanity.”

In November 1939, the new “Neutrality” Act was passed by Congress, and the war profiteers of 1914–1918 celebrated the return of the good old days - but the jubilation in the plutocratic camp survived the first winter of the war only briefly, for the events of the war in the spring and summer of 1940 brought about the collapse of England’s mainland allies and the establishment of a German counter-blockade front stretching from the North Cape to the Bay of Biscay—something the democratic world had never even imagined in its worst nightmares.
Now England stood alone; its naval supremacy proved to be porous, and its financial power limited: before everyone’s eyes, it was increasingly transforming from the great friend and proud standard-bearer of democracy into a begging little relative.
More and more, the United States—as the urgent pleas for help from British envoys such as Duff Cooper, Lothian, and Halifax, as well as Churchill’s speeches, left no doubt—found itself pushed into the role of the power that alone could still halt the impending collapse of Britain and, with it, European “democracy.”

In 1940, President Roosevelt was thus once again faced with the moral dilemma of whether he wanted to shorten or prolong the suffering of this war.
The world heard nothing to suggest that he had made any attempts to urge England to conclude a peace treaty; on the contrary, if Roosevelt had possessed the “powers” he envied in the Führer, he would certainly have come forward with the plan for the Lend-Lease Act as early as the beginning of 1940 - but once again, he had to bow to compelling domestic political necessities: his second Presidential term was set to expire in November 1940, and new elections were just around the corner.
Before his eyes lay a lofty goal that no U.S. President in history had ever achieved—he wanted to become President for a third time; however, he could only reach this pinnacle of his ambitious dreams if he promised his people that he would preserve peace, and only once he was firmly in the saddle for a third four-year term could he dare to lift the final veils and draw the United States headlong into the European war.
That is why, in the course of 1940, we witnessed a further refinement of the deceptive maneuvers, a further escalation of duplicity: throughout the first half of the year, the President gave the impression that he was not seeking a third Presidential term at all, and when he finally had to show his true colors in the summer, he bowed to the “general wish of his people,” while hinting that he was, after all, the only one who, thanks to his genius and worldwide prestige, could spare America from entering the war.
On the other hand, however, everything had to be done to encourage England—now fighting alone—to continue the war until the following winter after the Presidential election, which was to grant Roosevelt full freedom of action - for this reason, the President remained fairly low-key in public throughout 1940 and left it to his cabinet, the press, and Churchill to steer American public opinion down the path of involvement in the war.

Whenever he himself had to step in to fend off the fierce attacks by American pacifists against his policies, he resorted to a well-known tactic of political deception: he did not deny what he was actually and rightly accused of—namely, his determined policy of prolonging and expanding the war—but rather denied things that had been claimed only by uninformed outsiders or that he himself had just made up on the spot during his "denial."
Here is a typical example of this cheap but effective trick: in October 1940, in a radio campaign speech, he accused his Republican opponents of using deliberate fabrications and declared that the time had now come to respond to these fabrications with facts:

"It is untrue when a party or any candidate says that the President of the United States telephoned Mussolini and Hitler to betray and abandon Czechoslovakia; it is untrue that the current administration intends to put an end to American democracy within four years; it is untrue that a reelection of the current administration would mean the end of American democracy in four years.
But the worst thing that Republican leaders are spreading among our people is the accusation that the administration has made secret agreements with foreign nations without the knowledge of Congress or the people: I give you my solemn assurance that no secret treaty, no secret agreement, and no secret alliance of any kind exists, directly or indirectly, with any government, nation, or party anywhere in the world, to draw this country into war, or for any other reason whatsoever."

Such a barrage of denials and solemn assurances was bound to make a strong impression on the politically unsuspecting American masses, even if it included such silly antics as the story about Czechoslovakia. What more could a peace-loving Yankee ask of his President than the renewed pledge with which Roosevelt concluded this radio address:

"To Republicans and Democrats, to every man, woman, and child in the nation, I say: Your President and your great Secretary of State are pursuing the path of peace.
We are not arming ourselves for any foreign war, nor for the purpose of conquest, nor for intervention in any foreign conflict or dispute - I repeat once again that I stand by our party's platform under the motto: we will not participate in any foreign war, and we will not send our army, navy, or air force to fight abroad outside the American republics—except in the event of an attack.
I have worked for peace, and I will work for peace every day of my life."

At the same time, on October 26th, 1940, Roosevelt's "great" Secretary of State, Hull, struck a somewhat different note when, speaking to the American press; he railed at the top of his lungs:

"All peaceful nations, including the United States, are gravely threatened by the plans and actions of a small group of national leaders who have transformed their peoples into powerful instruments for the violent expansion of their rule: after assuring the United States and the majority of other nations that they were defending the principles upon which civilized international relations are founded, an army launched an attack—an army that shows no mercy, murders noncombatant women and children, and engages in deceit, villainy, and the confiscation of property.
In practical terms, they show no regard whatsoever for the rights of a neutral country, and they threaten even the most peace-loving nations and hold out the prospect of the worst consequences should they be

unwilling to consent to the conquerors absorbing other continents and seizing control of them, as well as of most of the seas.

Let no one imagine that these are merely outrageous excesses necessitated by war, which would be voluntarily abandoned once the battle is over: through their actions as well as their words, the conquerors have made it perfectly clear that they have undertaken a relentless attempt to degrade the civilized world, as we have known it in both hemispheres, to the status that the master once imposed on the slaves among nations and individuals."

And in response to this downright insane distortion of the conduct of war and the war aims of the young European nations, the venerable, white-haired, tall Secretary of State of the United States issued the warning that "the oceans by no means guarantee the United States that it cannot be attacked."
In conclusion, Hull emphasized that the government intended to continue making every possible facility available to the nations "defending themselves against the barbaric attack" for the procurement of supplies: that was the first public announcement of unlimited aid to England!

9. Terror

On November 5th, 1940, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected President of the United States for the third time: the fact, however, that his opponent, Wendell Willkie, still managed to secure 21.4 million popular votes compared to Roosevelt's 25.7 million is evidence of the deep, persistent distrust that broad segments of the American people harbored toward their President.
For the Republican Party and the peace advocates, the election campaign had been extremely difficult: to begin with, they had no candidate who could have stood up to Roosevelt, and Wendell Willkie, who had never been involved in politics and had made a name for himself only as an eccentric businessman, was a clear-cut stopgap candidate; added to this was the fact that Roosevelt's Democratic Party machine had taken full advantage of the past eight years in power to tie millions of voters to its trough, and furthermore, public opinion had already been so thoroughly poisoned in recent years by the Roosevelt camp's unscrupulous and widespread smear campaign that the President's opponents were under the pressure of a veritable reign of terror, which forced them to exercise great caution.
The most convincing proof of this is the astonishing fact that neither Wendell Willkie nor the Republican Party dared to attack Roosevelt's foreign policy unreservedly or to take the position that England had started this war itself and had enough sins to its name that it should now see for itself how peace with Germany might be achieved; instead, Wendell Willkie essentially agreed with Roosevelt's foreign policy slogans, and his party relied solely during the election campaign on the American people's aversion to the veiled dictatorship of a third Presidential term - this, however, was not enough to win the fight against a man of Roosevelt's cunning and ruthlessness.

Roosevelt wasted not a single minute after his election victory, and even the New Year's message he addressed to Congress on January 6th, 1941, was an open, blunt war speech that concluded with the words that America's lofty goal was victory—the victory of England.
Now Roosevelt no longer needed to be cautious; now he could openly state what he had been thinking, planning, and purposefully pursuing for years - at last, he was free from all domestic political constraints, and now it was possible to deal even more ruthlessly than before with the "peace mongers"—as those who think and feel purely in the American way are called in the U.S. today.
Senators and representatives, inventors and pioneers who had loyally served their country for decades or contributed to its global prestige—and who now still dared to openly attack the President's war policy—were branded "Nazi agents," "Hitler's minions," and members of the "Fifth Column"; anyone who wrote something undesirable in letters to the President received a reply from the... criminal investigation department stating that his name had been placed on the list of suspects!
The *New York Post* accused a well-known Democratic senator—that is, a member of Roosevelt's own party—who had opposed the Lend-Lease Act in Congress of having "given Hitler fifty-seven days of delayed aid to England" and of having been the "Führer's field marshal in the Battle of Washington."
Meanwhile, the President himself did not shy away from promoting and stoking the spy and agent hysteria in his New Year's message:

"Certainly, there is no danger as long as the British fleet retains its combat strength, and even if there were no longer a British fleet, it is unlikely that an enemy would be foolish enough to attack America by landing troops across thousands of ocean miles, as long as it has not secured strategic bases for this purpose.

But experience teaches us—especially the events in Norway—that seaports can be captured through treachery prepared over many years; the necessary bases will be occupied by secret agents and their gullible henchmen, and a large number are already here among us and in Latin America!
As long as the aggressor nations remain on the offensive, they—and not America—will determine the time, place, and method of the attack - therefore, the future of all American republics is in grave danger."

It would be nothing short of an insult to President Roosevelt to assume that he believed even a single word of what he dared to tell his people here.

The warmongers in Roosevelt's camp faced considerable difficulties with the question repeatedly posed to them: for one, why, in the first place, would the "aggressor powers" attack the American hemisphere? Roosevelt's general response—that the evil dictators were simply striving for "world domination"—was not sufficient in the long run, and consequently, behind the scenes at the White House, an interpretation was agreed upon, which we wish to quote in the words of Democratic Senator [Robert F.] Wagner from March 4th, 1941:

"The Lend-Lease Act is the last hope of the American people to preserve peace and security without resorting to the coercive measures of war: it would be an outrageous dereliction of duty on the part of our government to assume that, following a German victory over England, the Western Hemisphere would be safe from infiltration and attack by the totalitarian powers.
The Axis powers, as well as Russia, have set themselves the goal of destroying democratic government everywhere in the world: if England falls, the enemies of democracy will also have achieved victory over America, for America would then be forced to take preventive military measures on such a scale that they would undermine, impair, and endanger our wealth, our manpower, our economy, our standard of living, and perhaps even our form of government.
The strategy currently being employed in the Balkans would then also subjugate South America; countless air bases would spring up there, and an attack on the Panama Canal would become possible.
The Axis powers would launch a relentless economic war against the United States; Hitler would resent America's financial aid just as much as its shipments of war materiel."

Take close note of Wagner's tactics: the attack by the young European powers on America is presented as a foregone conclusion, while deliberately concealing the fact that not even a tension, let alone a conflict, between Europe and the U.S. would have arisen if Roosevelt's policy had not, for years on end, preached and demonstrated extreme hostility toward young Europe—without coercion or cause.
And now, with the atmosphere thoroughly poisoned, every further step toward war is presented as harmless with the claim that the earlier steps—such as the shipments of goods—had already been taken so badly by Hitler that there is practically nothing left to spoil: Hitler will take his revenge anyway, to the best of his ability.
Such Talmudic tricks, of which Roosevelt's policies in recent years were rife, are typical of the President's circle of friends and advisors, which consists largely of Jews.

This raises the question for the German reader: are there really no courageous men left among the 130 million Americans who would call a spade a spade and dare to expose Roosevelt's policies?

Certainly, such men exist, and manly and blunt words were spoken during the congressional debates on the Lend-Lease Act; however, we will refrain from listing the names and quotations and limit ourselves to an editorial in the *Chicago Tribune* of February 26th, 1941, which aptly summarizes the multifaceted background of Roosevelt's policies, specifically by referring to the membership list of the notorious "Committee for the Defense of the United States through Aid to the Allies":

"A cursory glance at the list of names reveals no fewer than four partners from the New York banking firm J. P. Morgan: Roosevelt, who once denounced these and other members of the plutocracy as self-serving economic royalists, as privileged princes, and as individuals who, out of greed, clipped the wings of the American imperial eagle, now endorses their actions.
The major bankers on the American East Coast certainly have international interests of great significance at stake, but even more important are their international social connections - admittedly, in England—where they have branches—the Morgans are regarded, at best, as distinguished members of the upper middle class, ranking below the aristocracy and far below the king and the royal court; J. P. Morgan himself, however, enjoys the friendship of the Archbishop of Canterbury and is permitted to go hunting for Scottish partridges with him.
Morgan's view is inevitably that England, with its caste system and its High Church, is superior to his own American homeland, where only average people live."

"Other members of the committee include James Warburg and Frank Altschul, both representatives of major banking firms in Hamburg and Paris that have influenced European finance and politics for a hundred years: instead of assessing the world situation solely in terms of American interests, they attack any opposition directed against their international aims.
Mrs. Winthrop Aldrich also falls into this category, for her husband, as President of Chase National Bank, recently informed shareholders that a major financial institution must approve Roosevelt's enabling bill.
Another group supporting the law to defend the Allies through American sacrifice is the clerical establishment: its most prominent representatives, such as Bishop Manning, regard the Church of England as the supreme authority for American church life."

The *Chicago Tribune* then calls for the exposure of these religious and racial ties so that those responsible for America's security will be guided solely by the interests of the American people.
The paper also counts New York City Mayor LaGuardia and the gentlemen of New York's millionaires' street, Park Avenue, among the group of so-called "hyphenated Americans" who are inspired by foreign sentiments:

"Today they are fundraising for Britain in order to impress impressionable minds through their glamorous social standing and to force elected officials to promote goals that are alien to this country and tragic for America's youth.
Many like-minded elements rally around this active elite of international bankers and other members of the aforementioned committee: the theater, film, and radio with their far-reaching propaganda; people who believe America should once again impose a different form of government on Germany, and still others who think America should completely destroy Germany; furthermore, there are people who regard America as a natural vassal nation, economically and intellectually dependent on England and reliant on England for its military defense.

Sleazy magazines and writers of sordid pieces advocate for the defense of the Allies through the sacrifice of America, as do individuals seeking positions in wartime organizations and others who are willing to destroy the American Republic if it means preserving the British Empire; still others would welcome the war because they believe it would bring America, by the third term of office, everything that Roosevelt would otherwise need four or five terms to achieve—namely, a different system of government and a different social and economic order."

The *Tribune*—which, incidentally, as can be seen from the above quotations, does not dare to utter the word "Judaism" but only dares to paraphrase it—accuses all these groups of intimidating the population of the American eastern states by stifling freedom of speech and freedom of expression, and of forcibly preventing them from expressing opposing views.

Social and financial pressure is being exerted on all Americans who would like to remain American, but are forced to remain silent for economic and other reasons: this constitutes sabotage against Americanism, which will eventually cause an unwelcome uproar when, after sacrifices have been made in vain, Congress launches an investigation to seek out the guilty parties, just as it did after the First World War; the *Tribune* believes that America can count itself fortunate if the investigation then satisfies the people who have been deceived, betrayed, and tormented, "without violent retaliation being carried out through self-help."

This editorial in the major American newspaper answers our question almost completely, for anyone who recalls the power of the Jews in Weimar-era Germany and bears in mind that, in New York and throughout the American East, the numerical, financial, and political influence of the Jewish community is still many times greater than it was here back then, will understand why the voices of reason in today's North America fall on deaf ears - but the *Chicago Tribune* is probably also right when it foresees a terrible awakening...

10. Unrestricted Aid to England

On March 12th, 1941, the U.S. House of Representatives finally passed the Lend-Lease Act by a vote of 317 to 71, shortly after the Senate had given its approval; President Roosevelt then signed the bill just a quarter of an hour later, thereby enacting it into law.
This means that on that same day, March 12th, the second, watered-down Neutrality Act of November 1939—which Roosevelt had at the time described as his "clear and definitive" policy—was also consigned to the trash bin: the term "neutrality" no longer appears at all in the Lend-Lease Act, but is now called the "Lend-Lease Bill."

In its first section, it lists the following as "articles serving national defense": weapons, ammunition, aircraft, ships, and boats; furthermore, machinery for the production, repair, maintenance, and operation of such articles, as well as materials and all components of which these "articles" are composed: according to this, almost anything can be designated by the President as an article serving national defense.
In the second section, the President is directed to conduct the nation's foreign policy in accordance with the principle that the security of the United States depends on the successful defense of democratic nations throughout the rest of the world: to this end, the President is authorized to lease, lend, or exchange any national defense items from the stockpiles of the U.S. Armed Forces, from the production of the defense industry, or from materials procured by any other means, to those states whose defense is deemed vital to the United States. A provisional amount of 1.5 billion dollars is hereby set aside for this purpose, and the U.S. Congress must give its consent for any additional war materiel to be transferred to England that exceeds this sum.
All of these Presidential powers are provisionally valid until June 30th, 1943; Congress has, however, reserved the right to revoke them at any time prior to that date by a simple majority vote.

Franklin D. Roosevelt has thus effectively been granted powers that no American President before him has ever possessed, and the legislature has effectively relinquished its greatest prerogative—the power to decide matters of war and peace: now it is left entirely to Roosevelt to determine which countries he deems "vital to the existence of the United States."
He is under no obligation to take previous statutory provisions into account, and he has the right to disclose military and state secrets of the United States to any foreign government of his choosing: this is a particularly important point, for it allows Roosevelt, for example, to deploy the American intelligence service and the American fleet for espionage and informant operations against the German and Italian armed forces in favor of England.
This law also authorizes him to open American ports and shipyards for the repair of foreign warships: now, suppose a British warship is damaged and pursued by German forces in a naval battle; it may now seek refuge in a North American port, undergo repairs there, and set sail again from this hideout to engage in further combat whenever it sees fit.

The isolationist members of Congress tried everything to banish such and other immediate sources of danger leading to entanglement in war from the law through additional clauses—but they failed! One of the opposition leaders therefore hit the nail on the head when he stated during the Senate debate that the

British Aid Act gave the President the authority to wage war throughout the world without a formal declaration of war.
The elderly Senator Hiram Johnson, who—unlike Roosevelt and Hull—had once also opposed the Treaty of Versailles and its ratification by the U.S., summed up his opinion of the Lend-Lease Act in a radio address with the words "deception, fraud, and pitfalls!" - but his appeal to America's mothers and fathers to stand up to the President also went unheeded.

The Roosevelt administration, however, did not even wait for the passage of the "Aid to England Act", as, in the months leading up to it, it had already taken a series of actions that turned its "policy of neutrality" into a farce:

1. Although a 300-mile zone had been agreed upon at the Pan-American Conference in Panama in September 1939, within which the American states would not tolerate acts of war by the European powers, Washington did not raise a single word of objection when the British and French militarily occupied the Dutch possessions in the Central American archipelago—an act that simultaneously flouted the Monroe Doctrine.

2. Washington also remained silent, or limited itself—as Wilson once did—to feeble protests on paper, when British warships committed brutal acts of piracy against German merchant ships and against Germans on American ships, not only within the 300-mile zone, but even within American territorial waters.

3. We have good reason to believe that as early as 1940, U.S. warships and aircraft in the Atlantic were acting as spies for the British fleet in its war of privateering against German ships—indeed, that they, for their part, drove German blockade-runners back into neutral ports or forced them to scuttle themselves: in the case of the Norddeutscher Lloyd steamer "Columbus," this has already been unequivocally established on the basis of American sources.[15]

4. The exchange arrangement between American destroyers and British bases has in practice already led to a "condominium," that is, the joint use of militarily valuable islands.

5. The deployment of American ships to repatriate American citizens through maritime zones particularly at risk of hostilities smacked suspiciously of a provocation of the worst kind.

6. At the end of July 1940, the U.S. cruiser "Vincennes" transported a large quantity of French state gold from Casablanca to America to remove it from the reach of German naval forces.

[15] The Norddeutscher Lloyd steamer "Columbus" left Veracruz, Mexico on December 14th, 1939, while being escorted by American destroyers through its neutrality zone; the intent was to return to Germany.
On December 19th, it was sighted by the British destroyer HMS Hyperion, while the American cruiser USS Tuscaloosa was observing; the "Columbus" chose to scuttle itself rather than surrender, and its crew and occupants were picked up by the USS Tuscaloosa, who treated them as rescued seamen rather than POWs. - The Translator

7. The “Adler Squadron”—established with American funds, equipped with American aircraft, and manned by American crews—has actively engaged in combat operations over English territory, and has already suffered its first casualty.

8. For months now, American pilots have been flying American aircraft purchased from England to Canada, even though this was prohibited by the Second Neutrality Act.

9. In Texas and Florida, Canadian pilots are being trained at American airfields to relieve the burden on the flight schools in Canada and England.

10. American embassies and legations in Europe are under strong suspicion of relaying all kinds of militarily important information to England via Washington - in this context, it should be noted that the number of American military attachés in Europe has increased dramatically since the start of the war. The *New York Post* wrote quite openly some time ago that Hull was not severing diplomatic relations with Germany solely because England would thereby lose “valuable listening posts in the Reich.”

11. U.S. diplomacy was actively working in many neutral countries to “secure” the governments of those countries against Germany; Roosevelt also sent his people to England itself (Hopkins, Donovan, Willkie) to publicly encourage the English people to continue their resistance, and in doing so, he simultaneously—going beyond normal diplomatic necessities—violated the law prohibiting U.S. citizens from entering the war zone.

12. Without any necessity, and contrary to previous practice, American Clipper mail planes regularly fly to the British Bermuda Islands to enable the British to snoop on all American mail bound for Europe; protests against this by American chambers of commerce and their requests to instead transport the European mail via the safe, undisturbed route across the Pacific Ocean and Siberia were strictly rejected by Roosevelt’s State Department.

13. For months now, German citizens, German companies, and German government offices in the U.S. have been harassed in every way by the American authorities and, in some cases, persecuted using the worst U.S. police methods (the “third degree”)[16].

When one is aware of all these and many other events, one can only smile at the Anglo-Jewish triumphal cries that a “new” North American foreign policy had begun on the day the Lend-Lease Act was passed - after all, we know that the Roosevelt administration has already done everything possible to help England and harm the Axis powers, and we are well informed as to what level of aid Britain can and cannot expect from the North American plutocracy in the near and distant future.
As early as the beginning of 1941, the Führer stated clearly and unequivocally:

“We have taken every conceivable possibility into account from the outset, weighed it soberly, and factored it in.
Anyone who believes they can help England must know one thing for certain: every ship, whether escorted or not, that comes within range of our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed.”

[16] Referring to the use of torture or psychological manipulation in order to obtain a confession. - The Translator

We have nothing more to say about the latest phase of Franklin D. Roosevelt's war policy.

Concluding Remarks

Roosevelt's background, his character, and his environment, together with the influence of Judaism in the United States, have largely solved the "American enigma" - but a European's common sense still rebels against the realization that a great nation is, for the second time in a generation, allowing itself to be led down paths that will undoubtedly end in an even greater material and moral hangover than Woodrow Wilson's First World War adventure.
The question has therefore often been raised as to whether Franklin Roosevelt and his administration were not, in reality, simply pursuing American power politics, with England serving merely as a means to an end: this assumption seems particularly plausible when one repeatedly hears from American newspapers and speeches—indeed, from Roosevelt's own mouth—that aid to England is primarily intended to give America a respite to complete its armaments, and that England is merely the western outpost of the United States.

Is it not perhaps even the case that the American President is aligning himself so closely with Britain solely to secure the largest possible share for his own country from the collapse of the British Empire; has not Churchill, too, openly presented the idea of a merger of the two Anglo-Saxon empires as probable and even desirable?
It is clear that the British plutocracy, under Churchill's leadership, is seriously toying with this idea, and it reasons as follows: if we should succeed, with America's help, in emerging from this war unscathed after all, so much the better! But if we do not succeed, then we—that is, the plutocratic upper class—will have earned the right to have a significant say in the future Anglo-American rump empire and to continue "the life we love," even if the capital of that empire is called Washington in the future - this line of reasoning is entirely understandable from the perspective of an unscrupulous opportunist like Winston Churchill.
From the American point of view, however, it is wrong: if Roosevelt were truly concerned only with profiting from Britain's collapse, then he would have embarked on a highly foolish course with his war policy, for in that case, it would have been wiser to curry favor with the rising powers of Europe and, after the war's end, simply annex Canada and perhaps—after establishing friendly relations with Japan—even Australia as well.
America can have no interest in the remaining parts of the British Empire, for relying on the vast sources of raw materials and foodstuffs in North and South America, the Western Hemisphere would then have found excellent trading partners in a renewed Europe and Asia in peacetime; instead, however, this President is plunging his country into a monstrous and costly endeavor that artificially distances it from that goal, alienates it from all the young great powers, and thereby creates all the preconditions for America's complete isolation after the war: the outpost and inheritance calculation therefore does not add up!
As difficult as it may be for a rational mind to accept, we must come to terms with the fact that the American people, who are still nationally unformed, are compelled to follow this insane Roosevelt course solely because an all-powerful clique of political and financial powerbrokers sees the salvation of Anglo-Saxon-style Judeo-Democracy as its life's mission.

In this treatise, we have exposed the New York Jewish circle from which the politician Franklin D. Roosevelt emerged.

For eight years, we have witnessed the immense efforts of international Jewry to turn the United States into its great stronghold, and now, in the spring of 1941, we heard that the Lend-Lease Act was legally drafted by Federal Judge Felix Frankfurter, financially underpinned by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., worked out in industrial terms by war industry advisor Bernard Baruch—Churchill's old friend and financial backer—and introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Sol Bloom - now, Roosevelt's policies are no longer a mystery.

Photos



President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

The "White House" in Washington, the President's official residence

Roosevelt signs one of his bills



Franklin Roosevelt among his friends

From left: Henry Morgenthau Sr., Herbert Lehmann, Franklin Roosevelt, Maurice Bloch, Howard Cullmann



The “Capitol” in Washington — the U.S. Capitol.



Roosevelt and David Scholtz, Governor of Florida



Roosevelt and (right) Lehmann, Governor of New York



Roosevelt and Samuel Roseman, who assists him in drafting speeches

Benjamin Cohen, Roosevelt's longtime private secretary, now assigned to the U.S. Embassy in London as the President's confidant

Bernard Baruch, one of the biggest war profiteers of the First World War, is now the President's close advisor on the war industry

Saul Blum (Sol Bloom), a leading member of the Democratic Party, introduced the "Aid to England Act" in the House of Representatives

Henry Morgenthau Jr., U.S. Secretary of the Treasury



Felix Frankfurter, Justice of the Supreme Court and the legal drafter of the "Aid to England Act"

Samuel Untermyer, chairman of the "Anti-Nazi Boycott Committee," supported Roosevelt's 1932 election with a donation of $7,000

The “First Lady” of the United States:
Eleanor Roosevelt speaks at a gathering of Black women about the barbarism of the Nazis

Roosevelt’s mother and LaGuardia, the half-Jewish mayor of New York



Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt appear before the public

Roosevelt's desk in the "White House":
the colorful collection of "souvenirs" and other kitsch on the President's desk attests to his taste and culture…

Roosevelt on a warship:
in the shadow of the big guns and admirals, the President feels particularly at ease

At the tea table at the Lehmann residence

From left: Mrs. Roosevelt, Lehmann, Roosevelt, Mrs. Lehmann

Secretary of State Hull and his Jewish wife

This is Bullitt

Lord and Lady Halifax aboard the battleship "King George V" en route to the U.S.

King George VI and President Roosevelt during his visit to Washington in 1939

"We, the people of the United States, are a nation that walks before God in the light of humanity."

- Roosevelt addressing Congress on September 21st, 1939